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ABSTRACT
The paper revisits the empirical link between fi scal policy and macroeco-
nomic stability. Our basic presumption is that by defi nition, the operation 
of automatic stabilizers should always and everywhere contribute to greater 
macroeconomic stability (output and consumption). However, two stylized 
facts seem at odds with that prediction. First, the moderating effect of auto-
matic stabilizers appears to have weakened in advanced economies between 
the mid-1990s and 2006 (the end of our main sample). Second, automatic 
stabilizers do not seem to be effective in developing economies. Our analysis 
addresses these apparent puzzles by accounting for the government’s am-
bivalent role as a shock absorber and a shock inducer for determinants of 
macroeconomic volatility over time. Results provide strong support for the 
view that fi scal stabilization operates mainly through automatic stabilizers. 
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RESUMEN
Este documento retoma el estudio de la relación empírica entre la política 
fiscal y la estabilidad macroeconómica. Nuestro supuesto básico es que, por 
definición, el funcionamiento de los estabilizadores automáticas debería 
siempre y en todas partes contribuir a una mayor estabilidad macroeconómica 
(producción y consumo). Sin embargo, dos hechos estilizados parecen estar en 
desacuerdo con esa predicción. En primer lugar, el efecto moderador de los 
estabilizadores automáticos parece haberse debilitado en las economías 
avanzadas entre los años 1990 y 2006. En segundo lugar, los estabilizadores 
automáticos no parecen ser eficaces en las economías en desarrollo. Nuestro 
análisis aborda estos enigmas aparentes por medio del análisis del papel 
ambivalente del gobierno como un amortiguador e inductor de shocks sobre 
los determinantes de la volatilidad macroeconómica en el tiempo. Los 
resultados proporcionan un fuerte apoyo a la opinión de que la estabilización 
fiscal opera principalmente a través de los estabilizadores automáticos.
Palabras clave: Estabilización Económica; Política Fiscal; Estabilidad Fiscal.
Clasifi cación JEL: E62; H6.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent developments in macroeconomic modeling and pressing 
policy challenges have revived the classic debate on the effectiveness of 
fi scal policy as an instrument of macroeconomic stabilization (van der 
Ploeg, 2005). On the theory side, the rapid development of micro-founded 
general equilibrium models with non-Ricardian features has allowed re-
searchers to assess the benefi ts of fi scal stabilization in a coherent and rig-
orous analytical framework (see Botman and others, 2006, for a survey). 
These studies confi rm the conventional wisdom that a timely countercycli-
cal response of fi scal policy to demand shocks is likely to deliver appreci-
ably lower output and consumption volatility (Kumhof and Laxton, 2009). 
However, well-intended fi scal activism can also be undesirable, when 
shocks are predominantly affecting the supply side (Blanchard, 2000), or 
squarely destabilizing, when information, decision and implementation 
lags unduly lengthen the transmission chain. On the policy side, a growing 
number of countries turned to fi scal policy as their primary stabilization 
instrument either because of changes in their monetary regime (currency 
board, hard peg, participation in a monetary union) or because fi nancial 
conditions deteriorated to the point of making monetary policy ineffective 
(Spilimbergo and others, 2008).
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Fiscal policy can contribute to macroeconomic stability through three 
main channels. The fi rst is the automatic reduction in government saving 
during downturns and increase during upturns, cushioning shocks to national 
expenditure (Blinder and Solow, 1974). Such automatic stabilization occurs 
because tax revenues tend to be broadly proportional to national income and 
expenditure, whereas public spending refl ects government commitments 
independent of the business cycle and entitlement programs specifi cally 
designed to support spending during downturns, including unemployment 
benefi ts.2 Also, to the extent that government consumption is less volatile 
than other components of GDP, the public sector contributes to output sta-
bility through a mere composition effect of domestic expenditure. Second, 
governments can deliberately change public spending and tax instruments to 
offset business cycle fl uctuations. Finally, the structure of the tax and trans-
fer system can be designed to maximize economic effi ciency and market 
fl exibility, thereby enhancing the resilience of the economy in the face of 
shocks. The notion of fi scal stabilization pertains to the fi rst two channels. 
The public’s demand for government-induced stability refl ects a 
number of factors that may vary over time and across countries, including 
the inherent resilience of the economy and the existence of alternative stabi-
lizers, such as an effective monetary policy and unrestricted access of indi-
vidual agents to fi nancial instruments. During the recent crisis, the perceived 
need for fi scal stabilization has been unquestionably high: the resilience of 
national economies was impaired by the depth and the global nature of the 
shock, agents faced either limited access to or high cost of self-insurance 
through credit markets and fi nancial institutions, and the fi repower of mon-
etary policy was constrained by the zero-bound on nominal interest rates. In 
the short term, the stabilizing role of fi scal policy relies on effective auto-
matic stabilizers and on the capacity of governments to engineer (and cred-
ibly phase out) a fi scal stimulus in a timely fashion. 
This paper puts the current revival of fi scal stabilization policies 
in a broader perspective by revisiting the contribution of fi scal policy to 
macroeconomic stability in both industrial and developing economies over 
the last 40 years. The study builds on earlier work by Galì (1994), van den 
Noord (2002), and Fatás and Mihov (2001, 2003), who investigate directly 
the cross-country relationship between fi scal policy indicators and output 
2. Darby and Mélitz (2008) and Furceri (2009) show that social spending—including health and 
retirement benefi ts—is more countercyclical than generally acknowledged. For instance, early re-
tirement and sick leave—which often protects employees against involuntary separation—are more 
likely to be used during downturns. 
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volatility. That approach has the advantage to incorporate in simple statisti-
cal tests various determinants of the stabilizing effect of fi scal policy, in-
cluding policymakers’ “reaction functions” and the actual impact of fi scal 
measures on output and private consumption. The resulting, reduced-from 
empirical relations thus provide useful information on the effectiveness of 
fi scal policy, while avoiding the methodological issues related to the estima-
tion of fi scal “multipliers.” Indeed, multipliers’ estimates highly sensitive to 
the identifi cation procedure of exogenous fi scal impulses (structural VARs, 
narratives, or DSGE model simulations), the nature of the shock (tax cuts, 
spending increases), and the behavior of monetary policy (Blanchard and 
Perotti, 2002; Perotti, 2005; Romer and Romer, 2008; and Horton, Kumar 
and Mauro, 2009 for a survey). 
Existing analyses of fi scal stabilization tend to focus on the role of au-
tomatic stabilizers in industrial economies. Many of those draw on the seminal 
insights of Galì (1994) and revolve around the negative relationship between 
output volatility and government size, used as a proxy for the cyclical sensi-
tivity of the budget balance. While the literature generally confi rms the coun-
tercyclical impact of automatic stabilizers, the relationship appears to be a 
complex one. First, non-linearities seem to exist,3 suggesting that the adverse 
effect of high tax rates on an economy’s resilience could more than offset the 
action of automatic stabilizers. Second, the relationship may be changing over 
time as structural changes moderating output volatility could be faster in econ-
omies with leaner governments.4 Finally, the relationship does not seem to 
hold beyond a narrow sample of industrial OECD countries.5 Debrun, Pisani-
Ferry and Sapir (2008) addressed the fi rst two concerns, introducing a time-
dimension in the Fatás-Mihov sample to control for potential determinants of 
the “great moderation,” (i.e. the steady decline in output volatility observed 
between the mid-1980s and the recent past). Their results confi rm the effec-
tiveness of automatic stabilizers in reducing output volatility.
This paper looks further into the robustness of the results described 
above. Our contribution rests on 4 elements. First, our sample includes 49 
3. Examples include Silgoner, Reitschuler and Crespo-Cuaresma (2002), and Martinez-Mongay 
and Sekkat (2005).
4. Debrun, Pisani-Ferry and Sapir (2008) and Mohanty and Zampolli (2009) document an ap-
parent breakdown of the relationship between government size and output volatility in the 1990s.
5. Fatás and Mihov (2003) fi nd that government size actually increases output volatility in a
cross-section of 91 countries. Viren (2005), using an even larger cross-section of 208 countries and 
territories, concludes that “the relationship between government size and output volatility is either 
nonexistent or very weak at best”. Mohanty and Zampolli (2009) find that even among OECD 
countries government size only has a modestly negative impact on output volatility.
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industrial and developing countries for which reasonably long time series 
exist for fi scal data covering the general government. Second, we take into 
account the potentially destabilizing impact of fi scal policy, as public fi -
nances are used to attain other goals than macroeconomic stability. Should 
bigger governments produce larger fi scal shocks, estimates of the impact of 
automatic stabilizers would be biased. Third, we account for the role of po-
tential substitutes to fi scal policy as a macroeconomic insurance mechanism, 
including fi nancial development, improved monetary policy credibility, and 
better economic policy governance. These variables may account for the 
decline in output volatility observed until the recent crisis and may prove 
important to properly identify the causal relation between automatic stabiliz-
ers and volatility (see Debrun, Pisani-Ferry, and Sapir, 2008, and Mohanty 
and Zampolli, 2009). Fourth, we investigate the extent to which fi scal pol-
icy contribute to lower private consumption volatility, as the latter is more 
closely related to welfare.
The main results can be summarized as follows. First, automatic sta-
bilizers strongly contribute to output stability regardless of the type of econ-
omy (advanced or developing), confi rming the effectiveness of timely, pre-
dictable and symmetric fi scal impulses in stabilizing output. The impact on 
private consumption volatility is quantitatively weaker and statistically less 
robust. Second, countries with more volatile cyclically-adjusted budget bal-
ances also exhibit more volatile output and private consumption. However, 
the result could be tainted by a reverse causality problem that we could not 
satisfactorily address with instrumental-variables techniques due to a weak-
instrument problem. Third, access of individual consumers to credit appears 
to exert a stabilizing infl uence on output and private consumption. A weaker 
contribution of credit supply to smooth cyclical fl uctuations could thus in-
crease the public’s appetite for fi scal stabilization. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 1 discusses data 
issues and reviews stylized facts. Section 2 develops the econometric analy-
sis, while Section 3 discusses the results and draws policy implications.
II. DATA AND STYLIZED FACTS
II.1 Governments as shock absorbers and shock inducers
The size of automatic stabilizers is commonly approximated by the 
ratio of general government expenditure to GDP. Using a rule of thumb ac-
cording to which the elasticity of government revenues and expenditure 
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(both in levels) to the output gap is 1 and 0 respectively, the expenditure-to-
GDP ratio is indeed equal to the semi-elasticity of the overall budget balance 
(in percent of GDP) to the output gap.6 
However, if size matters for automatic stabilization, it could also 
prove harmful for macroeconomic stability if bigger governments tend pro-
duce larger fi scal shocks than their leaner counterparts. To avoid an omitted-
variable bias, it is important to control for this possibility in the econometric 
analysis. The rest of this sub-section constructs a set of mutually-consistent 
fi scal indicators capturing three relevant dimensions of fi scal policy: auto-
matic stabilizers, systematically stabilizing discretionary policy, and non-
systematic policy (which can be stabilizing or not).
II.1.a Three dimensions of fi scal policy
To look at the cyclical properties of the overall budget balance, it is 
common to split it in two components: the cyclical balance and the cycli-
cally-adjusted balance (see for instance, Galì and Perotti, 2003). Changes in 
the cyclical balance give an estimate of the budgetary impact of aggregate 
fl uctuations through the induced changes in tax bases and certain mandatory 
outlays. By construction, the cyclical balance is zero when the output gap is 
closed (actual output is on trend), and its variations are thought to be outside 
the immediate control of the fi scal authorities. Subtracting the cyclical bal-
ance from the overall balance yields the cyclically-adjusted balance (CAB), 
or the hypothetical overall balance one would observe if output was on trend 
(or “potential”) level. Changes in the CAB are generally interpreted as re-
sulting mostly7 from discretionary actions by policymakers. 
The CAB itself reflects two dimensions of fiscal policy relevant for 
our analysis. The fi rst is the effect of policy decisions systematically related 
to changes in the actual or expected cyclical conditions of the economy. For 
instance, governments wishing to actively pursue a countercyclical policy 
could reduce taxes or increase government consumption whenever the econ-
omy is in a recession, while withdrawing the stimulus during the recovery 
and reducing public spending during booms. The response of the CAB to 
the cycle can either be pro-cyclical (running against automatic stabilizers) or 
countercyclical (augmenting the effect of automatic stabilizers). The second 
source of variations in CABs arises from budgetary changes that are not 
6. See equations (1) and (2) below.
7. Studies of the fi scal stance often exclude interest payments, as they refl ect past policies (pub-
lic debt) and fi nancial conditions.
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the result of the average response of fiscal authorities to the business cycle. 
This “exogenous” CAB can either reflect extraordinary fiscal stabilization 
efforts—such as those adopted in response to the recent crisis—or destabil-
izing fiscal impulses associated with other objectives of public finances (re-
distribution and effi ciency), or non-economic considerations (e.g. electoral 
budget cycle). 
Thus, from now, fi scal policy will be discussed in light of those three 
dimensions of the overall balance, namely:
(i) automatic stabilizers; 
(ii)  the “cyclical fi scal policy,” refl ecting the systematic response of the 
CAB to the business cycle; 
(iii) and the "exogenous discretionary fiscal policy" capturing CAB
changes that are not systematically related to current macroeconom-
ic conditions.8 
II.1.b. Quantifying the three dimensions 
Data analysis alone does not allow disentangling the impact of auto-
matic stabilizers from that of systematic discretionary stabilization. To solve 
that identifi cation problem, we simply assume that automatic stabilizers are 
adequately measured by the ratio of public expenditure to GDP. That as-
sumption enhances the comparability of our results with related studies and 
provides a simple and transparent metric applicable to all countries. But it 
entails a potential measurement error that we will need to keep in mind when 
interpreting the results (see further discussion below). 
A CAB consistent with our assumption is needed to derive indicators 
of the “cyclical” and exogenous policies defi ned above. As indicated earlier, 
government size is an exact measure of the sensitivity of the budget balance 
to the business cycle if revenue and expenditure elasticities to output are 1 and 
0 respectively. To see this, define the CAB (in percentage of trend output Y* as:
(1)
8. This is the terminology used by Fatás and Mihov (2009). For a more detailed discussion of
cyclical adjustment, see Fedelino, Ivanova and Horton (2009). 
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Where r is total revenue as a ratio of GDP (Y), Y* is the trend level of 
output, ηR is the elasticity of revenue to the output gap, g is the expenditure 
to GDP ratio, and ηG is the elasticity of expenditure to the output gap. Setting 
ηR = 1 and ηG =0 and denoting by b the overall budget balance (in percent of 
GDP) yields:
(2)
Where y is the output gap in percentage of trend output y≡(Y-Y*)/Y*, 
and gy is the cyclical balance. This formally establishes that the public ex-
penditure ratio is the semi-elasticity of the budget balance (in percent of 
GDP) to the output gap.9
Indicators of the cyclical and exogenous/discretionary fi scal policies 
can then be estimated for each country in our sample, using a simple time-
series regression:10
(3)
where the output gap yt is calculated as the relative deviation of actual GDP 
from an HP trend. The fi rst-order autoregressive term on the right-hand side of 
(3) accounts for persistence in budget balances, and effectively eliminates the 
severe fi rst-order serial correlation of residuals observed in static regressions. 
The cyclical fiscal policy is captured by β the short-term response of 
the CAB to the output gap. A negative value implies that a cyclical upturn 
(downturn) tends to deteriorate (improve) the CAB, indicating that govern-
ment actions are systematically destabilizing and offset—at least partly—the 
impact of automatic stabilizers on the economy. On the other hand, a positive 
coefficient on yt implies that on average, the government seeks to increase the 
counter-cyclical bent of fi scal policy through discretionary measures.
The effectiveness of fi scal   policy entails reverse causality from CAB 
to y, introducing a downward bias in OLS estimate of β. Also, equation (3) 
9. Of course, this does not mean that automatic stabilizers arise from the expenditure side since 
we assumed ηG =0. 
10. Galì and Perotti (2003), Wyplosz (2006) and Fatàs and Mihov (2009) use a similar speci-
fi cation to study the cyclical features of fi scal policy. Fatàs and Mihov (2003) and Afonso, Agnello 
and Furceri (2009) also rely on a regression-based method to distinguish between cyclicality, persis-
tence, and the volatility of public expenditure. 
77FISCAL POLICY AND MACROECONOMIC STABILITY: NEW EVIDENCE...
is parsimonious by necessity (time series are short in some countries), which 
could create an omitted variable bias. To alleviate potential biases in the 
estimated β’s, instrumental variable (IV) techniques are used. Instruments 
for the output gap include its own lagged value, log-differenced terms of 
trade and oil prices, and energy use per capita.11 A priori, these are adequate 
instruments—especially for small open economies—as cyclical fl uctuations 
are correlated with terms of trade shocks, oil prices and energy use per cap-
ita, without being directly infl uenced by the fi scal stance. For oil exporters, 
however, we used the lagged value of the output gap, the output gap of the 
United States, and its lagged value.12 
The exogenous discretionary policy is calculated as the variability 
(standard deviation) of a residual , where 
and are obtained from IV estimation. This differs from the standard er-
ror of residuals in equation (3),  . The reason is that, having 
instrumented the output gap, the residual of (3) would incorporate the non-
instrumented part of the output gap ( ), introducing co-movement 
between our measure of discretionary policy and output gap volatility. This 
would in turn create a simultaneity bias in the regressions performed to esti-
mate the effect of fi scal policy on output gap variability. By their very nature, 
these residuals capture more than discretionary policy decisions, including 
measurement errors, and the direct budgetary impact of certain shocks over 
and above their infl uence on economic activity (for instance, exchange rate 
fl uctuations affecting interest payments and commodity-related revenues, 
the infl uence of asset prices on certain revenue categories, and infl ation 
shocks). The notion of “exogenous discretionary policy” should therefore be 
interpreted with caution. While equation (3) could be augmented to account 
for some of these effects, the measurement of pure shocks raises other issues 
that would ultimately alter the transparency of our simple approach.
II.1.c. Caveats
In interpreting our empirical results, one should keep in mind that gov-
ernment size is only an approximation of the cyclical sensitivity of the budget 
11. Lee and Sung (2007) estimate the responsiveness of fi scal policy to cyclical fl uctuations,
taking the average of GDP growth rates in neighboring countries, weighted by the inverse of the 
distance between the two countries, as an instrument.
12. There are fi ve oil producing countries in the sample. Ideally, the non-oil fi scal balances
should be used in the regression. However, no suffi ciently long time series were available to obtain 
meaningful estimates of β. Dropping these countries from the sample does not alter the results.
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balance. To assess the likelihood of any bias introduced by that proxy, we look 
at the relation between the public expenditure to GDP ratio and the semi-elas-
ticities of the budget balance to the output gap estimated by the OECD for most 
of its member countries (Figure 1). These estimates partly take into account the 
impact of tax progressivity and cyclically-sensitive expenditure.13 The regres-
sion line is statistically indistinguishable from a 45-degree line, indicating that 
government size is a reliable proxy of automatic stabilizers in OECD countries. 
Figure 1
Government Size and Cyclical Sensitivity of the Budget Balance (OECD)
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Outside the OECD, however, lower output sensitivities may prevail. 
On the revenue side, a greater share of indirect taxes in revenues and a lower 
degree of progressivity in direct taxes tend to weaken the responsiveness of 
tax revenues to income. On the expenditure side, unemployment insurance 
and other social safety nets are generally less developed. Given this, we 
may overestimate the size of automatic stabilizers in developing countries, 
while underestimating their impact on output and consumption volatility. 
We would correspondingly overestimate the stabilizing infl uence of cyclical 
fi scal policy, as  would capture any measurement error in the size of au-
tomatic stabilizers. Another issue is that short time series limit our ability to 
13. Some ad-hoc assumptions remain, however, including a unit-elasticity of indirect taxes and 
a zero-elasticity for expenditure except unemployment benefi ts. The latter may be a strong assump-
tion in light of Darby and Mélitz (2009) who show that social spending other than unemployment 
benefi ts exhibits a signifi cant countercyclicality, including health and pension expenditure. Building 
on these results, Furceri (2009) estimates that social spending alone is able to offset about 15 percent 
of output shocks.
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test for the presence of structural breaks in the relation between the CAB and 
the output gap. In general, tests conducted for OECD countries—for which 
we have time-series starting in 1970—do not allow to reject the null hypoth-
esis that  is stable between two sub periods (1970-89 and 1990-2006). 
II.1.d. Output volatility and automatic stabilizers: stylized facts
The seminal studies by Galì (1994) and Fatás and Mihov (2001) sug-
gest that the effectiveness of automatic stabilizers is already evident from the 
negative unconditional correlation between real GDP growth variability and 
the size of government, and they show this for a sample of selected OECD 
countries between 1960 and the early 1990s. Our broader sample, which 
covers selected developing economies and ends in 2006, exhibits a similar 
correlation (Figure 2, top panel). Subsequent analyses qualifi ed this result, 
suggesting that the relation is likely to be non-linear and unstable over time. 
Using the same set of countries as Fatás and Mihov (2001), Debrun, Pisani-
Ferry and Sapir (2008) document a dramatic weakening of the negative rela-
tion after the mid 1990s, a stylized fact present in our sample for advanced 
OECD countries (Figure 2, center panel). Econometric analysis by the same 
authors also revealed non-linearities in this relation, implying strongly de-
creasing returns in automatic fi scal stabilization beyond a certain threshold 
of government size. Silgoner, Reitschuler and Crespo-Cuaresma (2002), and 
Martinez-Mongay and Sekkat (2005) found similar non-linearities in a sam-
ple of EU member states. 
Figure 2
Automatic Stabilizers and Output Volatility (1970-2006)
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Note: each observation represents a combination of government size and real GDP growth 
volatility observed in one country over a given decade. Source: Authors’ calculations.
Although the literature generally supports the effectiveness of auto-
matic stabilizers in OECD countries, some have suggested that the result 
may not hold in developing economies. In particular, Viren (2005) fi nds that 
the negative relation between government size and GDP volatility does not 
exist when developing economies are included in the sample. Using our 
sample, scatter plots indeed depicts a weakly positive correlation for the 
subset of developing countries (Figure 2, bottom panel). 
These stylized facts raise two questions. First, it is unclear why au-
tomatic stabilizers per se would be subject to strong “decreasing returns.”14 
Second, even if government size exaggerates the magnitude of automatic 
14. That said, in a reduced-form IS-curve, the relation between output and the size of automatic 
stabilizers is log-linear because the fi scal impulse stemming from the operation of stabilizers itself 
depends on output (see the Appendix).
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stabilizers in developing countries, the existence of a positive relationship 
remains counterintuitive. Both puzzles are consistent with the need to take 
into account the shock-inducing aspect of fi scal policy. The appearance of 
decreasing returns could indeed result from the fact that bigger governments 
generate more destabilizing fi scal shocks, as documented in Debrun and 
Kapoor (2010). Likewise, the apparent ineffectiveness of automatic stabi-
lizers in developing countries may have to do with more pervasive institu-
tional weaknesses and political economy constraints in these countries that 
magnify the shock-inducing part of fi scal policy to the point of overcoming 
automatic stabilizers.
Another interesting characteristic of the relation between output vola-
tility and government size is that it seems to be evolving over time, stress-
ing the importance to examine possible causes for such evolution. Debrun, 
Pisani-Ferry and Sapir (2008) show that the factors driving the trend decline 
in output volatility until the recent crisis—the so-called great moderation—
were more powerful in countries with smaller government sectors than oth-
ers. We can verify this in our broader sample and divide countries into 4 
categories along 2 dimensions: trade openness and government size (cut-off 
levels are the median values). We consider only the last two periods of our 
sample 1990-99 and 2000-06 to cover all the countries. 
For both sub-periods, output volatility is on average larger in countries 
with smaller governments, regardless of trade openness (Figure 3). Rodrik’s 
(1998) observation that more open economies are generally more volatile is 
verifi ed for 1990-99, but not for the more recent period. Indeed, the bottom 
panel of Figure 3 shows that the decline in average output volatility between 
the two subperiods has been more pronounced in more open economies, 
and among the latter in countries with smaller governments. This suggests 
that open economies with smaller government took better advantage of the 
factors driving the great moderation, such as improved access to fi nancial 
instruments, credit and external fi nancing, allowing economic agents to bet-
ter smooth consumption and plan investment. Also, openness tends to raise 
the economic cost of policy mistakes, contributing to better macroeconomic 
management, including more countercyclical macroeconomic policies.
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Figure 3
Output volatility over time
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III. ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS
III.1. Testing the effectiveness of automatic stabilizers
Following Fatás and Mihov (2001), the empirical test is based on the 
cross-country relation between government size and output volatility. As we 
also take into account time-varying factors that may affect the public’s de-
mand for fi scal stabilization or the government’s incentives to provide such 
stabilization (Debrun, Pisani-Ferry and Sapir, 2008), the baseline empirical 
model is a panel regression with period-fi xed effects:15
,     (4)
with i=1,…49 (countries) and i=1,…4 (10-year period). Yi,t is a measure of 
real GDP volatility, the Pt’s symbolize period fi xed effects, Gi,t denotes the 
size of automatic stabilizers (logarithm of public expenditure in percent of 
GDP), Cyci and Discri,t are the cyclical and discretionary dimensions of fi s-
cal policy discussed in section 1, the Xj’s are control variables, and νi,t is the 
error term. As the cyclicality indicator is an estimated coeffi cient, it is some-
times not statistically different from zero. To reduce the noise stemming 
from such uncertainty, we set Cyci equal to zero for countries where the  is 
statistically insignifi cant at the 10 percent confi dence level. The discretion-
ary dimension Discri,t is calculated for each subperiod to capture any change 
in the average magnitude of fi scal policy shocks non-systematically related 
to the business cycle. 
By default, we calculate output volatility as the standard deviation of 
real GDP growth over each period t. However, since this measure is sensitive 
to variations in potential growth (over time and across countries), we system-
atically checked the robustness of our results using the standard deviation 
of the fi rst differenced output gap (calculated by us for all countries as the 
relative difference between actual real GDP and its HP-fi ltered series). The 
focus on aggregate output volatility—instead of privately-generated GDP 
for instance—is justifi ed by the fact that the contribution of fi scal policy to 
macroeconomic stability also operates through composition effects of na-
tional expenditure (Andrés, Doménech and Fatàs, 2008). Although there is 
15. The time dimension comprises 4 periods over which annual data have been averaged (1970-
79, 1980-89, 1990-99 and 2000-06). The panel is unbalanced because of data limitations for devel-
oping and emerging market economies. The Appendix reports data sources. Input from auxiliary 
regressions can be found in Debrun and Kapoor (2010).
A rejection of the null hypothesis that  against the alterna-
tive  is consistent with the effectiveness of automatic stabilizers. The 
Appendix formally illustrates that, given a sample average of 0.38 for gov-
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no evident theoretical reason for rejecting these effects, we also investigated 
the relationship between our fi scal indicators and the variability of private 
consumption because the latter is more directly related to welfare. 
ernment size, plausible values of  lie between -0.5 and -2.6. As we have 
more observations than most comparable studies, we are better placed to 
deal with the omitted-variables and reverse causality issues inherent to a 
single-equation approach. More specifi cally, we introduce determinants of 
volatility that have been related to the “great moderation” episode and are 
suspected to have weakened the relation between government size and out-
put volatility. We then we assess the robustness of our results, and expand 
the analysis to private consumption volatility.
III.2 Fiscal policy: shock-absorbing or shock-inducing?
We fi rst estimate a parsimonious model deliberately omitting discre-
tionary and cyclical dimensions of fi scal policy as well as time-series deter-
minants of output volatility (Table 1). The results are consistent with two 
stylized facts noted earlier. First, non-OECD-20 countries are both more 
volatile and have smaller governments, explaining why the standard sta-
bilization result holds for the whole sample but not for the non-OECD-20 
subset. Second, among the OECD-20 group, the effectiveness of automatic 
stabilizers seems to have decreased substantially over the last two decades.
We conjectured earlier that omitting Discri,t could entail a serious up-
ward bias in estimates of  if bigger governments also tended to induce 
larger shocks. The results summarized in Table 2—which now include all 
dimensions of fi scal policy and the time-series controls—lend support to 
that hypothesis: the size of government now has a negative and statistically 
signifi cant impact on output volatility, and this regardless of whether we 
restrict the sample to certain economies or sub-periods. The absolute values 
of  are higher than previously estimated, and the confi dence intervals are 
narrower. They are also quantitatively similar to Fatás and Mihov (2001)—
around 2—despite a very different sample.
85FISCAL POLICY AND MACROECONOMIC STABILITY: NEW EVIDENCE...
Table 1
A parsimonious model
STANDARD DEVIATION OF REAL GDP GROWTH RATE
Dependent Variable  All  Non-
OECD 
 OECD 
(1970-89) 
 OECD 
(1990-2006) 
1 2  3 4
Openness  1.143
 (1.32) 
 0.150 
(0.11) 
 1.617* 
(1.87) 
 0.720 
(1.17) 
Automatic Stabilizers –1.614*** 1038 –2.224*** –0.244
 (–4.45) -1.35  (–2.78)  (–0.41) 
Constant 0.728  5.614*** –0.418 0.675
-1.21 -3.19   (–0.48) -0.99
Observations 152 75  37 40
R -squared 0.14 0.15 0.33 0.32
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses. Time effects are not reported. Stars denote statistical 
signifi cance at conventional levels (* for 10 per cent, ** for 5 per cent, and *** for 1 per cent).
Table 2
Introducing Cyclical and Discretionary Dimensions of Fiscal Policy
(Dependent variable: standard deviation of real GDP growth rate)
Dependent 
Variable 
 OECD-20  Non 
OECD-20 
 All  All  All  All 
 1970-89  1990-2006
1 2 3 4 5 6
Openness  0.717 
(1.56) 
 0.462
 (0.48) 
 0.507 
(0.79) 
 –0.389
(-0.33) 
 0.684 
(1.00) 
 0.519 
(0.86) 
Automatic 
Stabilizers 
 –1.409***
 (–2.93) 
 –1.605*
(–1.79) 
 –2.013***
(–5.00) 
 –1.290**
(–2.30) 
 –2.257***
(–3.89) 
 –1.680***
(–4.21) 
Central Bank 
Independence 
 –0.117
(–0.27) 
 0.715 
(0.47) 
 1.096* 
(1.79) 
 0.138 
(0.18) 
 1.404 
(1.63) 
 –2.728***
(–2.62) 
Financial 
Development 
 –0.446*
(–1.98) 
 –0.01
(–0.02) 
 –0.788***
(–3.01) 
 –0.577
(–1.08) 
 –0.770**
(–2.56) 
 –0.550**
(–2.20) 
Cyclical 
Fiscal Policy 
 –0.065
(–0.27) 
 0.209 
(0.15) 
 0.114 
(0.38) 
 –0.214
(–0.51) 
 0.030 
(0.07) 
 0.026 
(0.09) 
Discretionary 
Fiscal Policy 
 0.016 
(0.16) 
 0.911*** 
(4.62) 
 0.672*** 
(4.64) 
 0.186 
(1.19) 
 0.877*** 
(4.66) 
 –0.451*
(–1.79) 
Interaction: 
Discretion x CBI 
 …  …  …  …  …  2.118***
(3.83) 
Constant  1.013** 
(2.13) 
 –2.501
(–1.17) 
 –1.134
(–1.51) 
 0.992 
(0.42) 
–2.617**
(–2.42)  … 
Observations 
R -squared 
 77 
0.40 
 56 
0.52 
 133 
0.50 
 47 
0.35 
 86 
0.57 
 133 
0.58 
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses. Time effects are not reported. Stars denote statistical 
signifi cance at conventional levels (* for 10 per cent, ** for 5 per cent, and *** for 1 per cent).
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These results differ from Fatás and Mihov (2003) who fi nd that gov-
ernment size has a positive effect on volatility in a cross-section of 91 coun-
tries. Their model is similar to (4) except that (i) they have no measure of 
Cyci,(ii) the time dimension is missing, and (iii) their measure of Discri,t is 
based on public consumption only. Two important reasons for the difference 
are that our approach allows for a richer set of relevant determinants of vola-
tility (e.g. fi nancial development) and that it uses measures of automatic sta-
bilizers, cyclical policy and discretionary policy that are mutually consistent 
and based on a broad coverage of the government sector.
While we fail to fi nd  any significant stabilizing impact of the cyclical 
dimension (a sign that this series may be too noisy), the coeffi cient  on the discretionary dimension is positive and signifi cant for the unrestricted 
sample and for the sub-sample excluding the OECD-20. In contrast,  is 
not signifi cantly different from zero in the OECD-20. Also, the fi t of the 
model increases substantially. These results suggest that discretionary fi scal 
policy is likely to be an important contributor to output volatility outside the 
core OECD economies covered in previous studies. This is in line with Fatás 
and Mihov (2003), although our measure of discretionary policy—based on 
budget balance volatility—is quite different from theirs— volatility of GDP-
growth-adjusted public consumption. 
An interesting observation is that the degree of central bank inde-
pendence has a signifi cantly positive impact on volatility, a result largely 
driven by the presence of the non-OECD-20 countries in the sample. This 
could suggest that anti-infl ationary credentials take time to build up despite 
rising degrees of legal independence, or that productivity shocks and deci-
sion lags entail a meaningful trade-off between real and nominal stability. 
Another possibility is that coordination failures in the policy mix 
could be more frequent when monetary and fi scal authorities independently 
pursue different objectives. Specifi cally, fi scal impulses unrelated to rou-
tine stabilization are more likely to lead to costly confl icts with monetary 
authorities when the latter are politically independent than when they are 
forced to accommodate fi scal shocks. To explore that conjecture, we added 
to the model an interaction term between the index of central bank inde-
pendence (CBI) and our measure of exogenous fi scal policy. In the pres-
ence of the interaction term, the estimated coeffi cient of CBI turns negative 
and signifi cant—as one would expect if CBI induces improvements in the 
quality of monetary policy—whereas the interaction term is positive and 
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highly signifi cant. One interpretation is that fi scal impulses not systemati-
cally related to output stabilization undermine the benefi ts of central bank 
independence, refl ecting possible coordination failures in the policy mix. 
The fact that  also turns negative when the interaction term is present 
could indicate that such confl icts would be the main reason for the positive 
conditional correlation between fi scal discretion and output volatility. 
Finally, we see that the moderating impact of fi nancial development 
on output volatility is robust to the introduction of our fi scal controls although 
that effect is mainly driven by more recent (post-1990) observations.
III.3 Robustness checks
We now check the robustness of our results to common econometric 
issues, fi rst examining the possibility of reverse-causality, and then assess-
ing the risk of an omitted-variable bias. 
III.3.a Endogeneity
Equations (4) and (5) are potentially subject to reverse causality prob-
lems. For instance, governments concerned with output stability could argu-
ably adjust their fi scal behavior and the size of automatic stabilizers to the 
intensity of exogenous disturbances affecting the economy (Rodrik, 1998). 
Reverse causality could also bias estimated coeffi cients on CBI and fi nancial 
development if more volatile economies are more inclined to delegate mon-
etary policy to an independent agency with a clear stabilization mandate, 
and if private agents take better advantage of fi nancial services to self-insure 
against the income effect of aggregate fl uctuations. 
Following Fatás and Mihov (2001, 2003), we selected instruments 
capturing institutional and structural characteristics of countries likely to 
be correlated with our explanatory variables but presumably orthogonal to 
output volatility itself. Institutional instruments include the electoral rule 
(proportional vs. majoritarian), the type of political system (presidential vs. 
parliamentary), the presence of political constraints (number of veto points 
in the government), and the distribution of ideological preferences. Other 
instruments are GDP per capita (at PPP, in log), the dependency ratio, the 
rate of urbanization, and a dummy variable identifying oil producers. 
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Table 3
Two-Stage-Least-Squares (2SLS) Estimates
(Dependent variable: standard deviation of real GDP growth rate)
Instrumented Variable  Automatic 
Stabilizers 
 Cyclical 
Fiscal 
Policy 
Discretion-
ary Fiscal 
Policy 
 Financial 
Development 
 Central 
Bank Inde-
pendence 
1 2 3 4 5
 Openness  0.528 
(0.83) 
 0.472 
(0.75) 
 0.491 
(0.74) 
 0.539 
(0.85) 
 0.566 
(0.79) 
 Automatic 
Stabilizers 
 –2.271***
(–4.17)
 –2.169***
(–5.11)
 –1.948***
(–4.07)
 –2.144***
(–5.00)
–2.802***
(–4.31)
 Central Bank 
Independence 
 1.096* 
(1.69) 
 1.050* 
(1.75) 
 0.790 
(1.23) 
 1.084* 
(1.80) 
 3.873* 
(1.85) 
 Financial 
Development 
 –0.817***
(–3.21)
 –0.814***
(–3.14)
 –0.971***
(–3.45)
 –1.083***
(–2.61)
–0.902***
(–3.25)
 Cyclical Fiscal Policy  0.125 
(0.44) 
 0.012 
(0.01) 
 –0.225
(–0.75) 
 0.166 
(0.57) 
 0.099 
(0.29) 
 Discretionary Fiscal Policy  0.671*** 
(4.22) 
 0.659*** 
(3.64) 
 0.322 
(0.87) 
 0.650*** 
(4.15) 
 0.734*** 
(4.92) 
 Constant  –1.201
(–1.31) 
 –1.037
(–1.32) 
 –0.063
(–0.06) 
 –0.896
(–1.24) 
–3.070*
(–1.86) 
 Observations 127 127 127 127 127
 R -squared 0.49 0.49 0.44 0.48 0.39
 Wu-Hausman Test 
(p -value) 
0.79 0.92 0.05 0.31 0.11
 Hansen J Test (p -value) 0.24 0.25 0.41 0.38 0.37
 Weak Identifi cation 
(F -stat) 
 27.76** 3.4 7.65  24.41** 2.55
 Exogeneity Tests 
(p -value): 
 Automatic Stabilizers  … 0.9 0.72 0.75 0.53
 Central Bank Independence 0.3 0.1 0.64 0.1  … 
 Financial Development 0.26 0.15 0.16  … 0.07
 Discretionary Fiscal Policy 0.13 0.07  … 0.34 0.26
 Cyclical Fiscal Policy 0.04  … 0.26 0.1 0.25
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses. Time effects are not reported. Stars denote statistical 
signifi cance at conventional levels (* for 10 per cent, ** for 5 per cent, and *** for 1 per cent).
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The specifi cation used for 2SLS estimation is column (3) of Table 2. 
We instrumented potentially endogenous explanatory variables one by one, 
each time testing for the endogeneity of other suspicious instruments.16 Formal 
exogeneity tests (Wu-Hausman—WH) only rejected the null hypothesis that 
OLS estimates are consistent for tiDiscr ,  (strongly) and the index of central 
bank independence (marginally), suggesting that 2SLS should be preferred 
over OLS (column (3) and (5) of Table 3). Testing for the orthogonality be-
tween each non-instrumented explanatory variable (i.e. the included instru-
ments) and the error term broadly support the conclusions of the WH tests. 
Two-stage least-squares estimates confi rm the effectiveness of auto-
matic stabilizers (column (1) of Table 3) and the stabilizing impact of fi -
nancial development (column (4)), although the coeffi cient for the latter is 
somewhat higher in absolute value. The other results are diffi cult to interpret 
because instruments appear to be weak, meaning that the explanatory power 
of the excluded instruments in the fi rst stage regression is too low to provide 
reliable identifi cation. Hence 2SLS estimators are biased and ineffi cient, espe-
cially in small samples such as ours (Stock, Wright and Yogo, 2002). It is nev-
ertheless notable that our indicator of fi scal policy discretion does not appear to 
signifi cantly raise volatility when it is instrumented. This could be a sign that 
this indicator also refl ects other sources of output volatility not captured by the 
statistical model, but with potentially signifi cant budgetary consequences (e.g. 
commodity or asset prices, exchange rates, infl ation shocks…).
III.3.b Omitted variables 
The omission of relevant explanatory variables could also entail a cor-
relation between the error term and the independent variables. We thus further 
examine the possibility of a bias by adding potential determinants of output 
volatility to the baseline specifi cation. Keeping our focus on the effectiveness 
of automatic stabilizers, we follow Fatás and Mihov (2001) and select con-
trols likely to be correlated with both government size and output volatility.17 
None of the added explanatory variable turns out being statistically signifi cant 
(neither individually nor together, as shown in Table 4), and estimates of the 
coeffi cients of interest (automatic stabilizers, discretionary fi scal policy and 
fi nancial development) are not statistically different across regressions. 
16. Instrumenting multiple right-hand-side variables did not yield any meaningful result, in
large part refl ecting the weak-instrument issue discussed below.
17. These authors discuss in detail the motivation for each of those controls. 
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In a panel context, a natural test for the robustness of our results to omit-
ted variables is to add country fi xed-effects. The limited size of our sample 
limits our investigation to the parsimonious specifi cations in columns (8) and 
(9), which exclude the cyclical policy indicator because it has no time-series 
variance. The stabilizing impact of fi nancial development does not survive this 
“acid test,” pointing to the possibility that some underlying, country-specifi c 
variables —perhaps “deep” institutional determinants18— jointly determine 
the level of fi nancial development and macroeconomic volatility. In contrast, 
automatic stabilizers and discretionary policy still exhibit respectively stabi-
lizing and destabilizing impacts on GDP growth. The interaction between CBI 
and discretionary fi scal policy passes the test as well, adding support to the 
possibility that coordination failures in the policy mix could be a key channel 
through which fi scal discretion increases output volatility.
III.3.c Fiscal policy and private consumption volatility
While macroeconomic stabilization aims at reducing the volatility of 
output, welfare gains are often thought to be more closely associated with 
the stability of real private consumption.19 Although output and consump-
tion (real growth) volatilities are strongly correlated (unconditional corre-
lation coeffi cient of 0.69 in our sample), the determinants of private con-
sumption refl ect individual choices that may be more directly responsive 
to opportunities to smooth consumption than to fi scal aggregates. Variance-
decomposition exercises performed by Debrun, Pisani-Ferry and Sapir 
(2008) provide some support to that presumption, showing that automatic 
stabilizers—income tax payments and transfers—have not contributed to 
the decline in consumption volatility observed since the mid-1980s. 
To model private consumption volatility, we follow equation (4). The 
results are qualitatively comparable to those found for output volatility, but 
with important nuances (Table 5). First, the stabilizing effect of fi nancial 
development is quantitatively large and statistically signifi cant, confi rming 
the important role of access to credit in providing consumption-smoothing 
opportunities to consumers. Second, automatic stabilizers continue to play 
a stabilizing role, although it is quantitatively smaller than for output (by 
roughly ½ in most regressions) and less precisely estimated. Instrumenting 
government size yields quantitatively similar results to the output volatility 
equation. 
18. See Acemoglu and others (2002).
19. The argument is not so clear-cut, however, because output fl uctuations are likely to be more 
tightly related to employment, and thereby leisure.
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Table 5
Fiscal Policy and Consumption Volatility
(dependent variable: standard deviation of real GDP growth rate)
Estimator:   OLS  2SLS 
  … …  Automatic 
Stabilizers 
Cyclical 
Fiscal 
Policy 
 Discre-
tionary 
Fiscal 
Policy 
Financial 
Develop-
ment 
Instrumented 
Variable: 1 2 3 4 5 6
Openness  1032 1059 1417 1050 1227 1.348
 (1.11) (1.19) (1.59) (1.10) (1.28) -1.43
Automatic   –1.140* –0.772  –2.046*** –1.307** –1.091* –1.263** 
Stabilizers (–1.94) (–1.36) (–2.61) (–2.08) (–1.63) (–1.99) 
Central Bank  0.944 –2.886* 1637 1289 0.958 1.375
Independence (1.08) (–1.86) (1.62) (1.51) (1.08) -1.58
Financial 
Development
 –1.429***  –1.196***  –1.394*** –1.384*** –1.633*** –2.228***
(–2.94) (–2.42)  (–3.15) (–3.13) (–3.23) (–2.91) 
Cyclical 
Fiscal Policy 
 –0.511 –0.606  –0.387 –1.11 –0.875* –0.318 
(–1.15) (–1.43) (–0.87) (–0.88) (–1.81) (–0.70) 
Discretionary 
Fiscal Policy 
 0.525*** –0.606*  0.611*** 0.526** 0.162 0.521** 
(2.51) (–1.89) (2.84)  (2.04) (0.39) -2.39
 Interaction: 
Discretion x CBI 
 … 2.118***  …  …  …  … 
 (2.76)     
 Constant  0.307 2.575**  –1.028 0.168 1210 0.514
(0.28) (2.25) (–0.80) (0.13) (0.78) -0.44
Observations  131 131  126 126 126 126
R -squared 0.35 0.39 0.35 0.35 0.33 0.34
 Wu-Hausman 
Test (p -value) … … 0.24 0.65 0.14 0.06
Hansen J Test 
(p -value) … … 0.16 0.12 0.17 0.34
Weak Identifi ca-
tion (F -stat) … … 27.14** 3.37 7.44 23.49** 
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses. Time effects are not reported. Stars denote statistical 
signifi cance at conventional levels (* for 10 per cent, ** for 5 per cent, and *** for 1 per cent).
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However, these results are not robust to the introduction of additional 
control variables, even though the latter remain non-signifi cant. Third, the 
discretionary dimension of fi scal policy is generally destabilizing; but si-
multaneity concerns remain. Fourth, the cyclical dimension of fi scal policy 
now consistently has the expected negative impact on consumption vola-
tility although large estimation errors20 remain. Still, the contrast with the 
output equations is striking enough to suggest that systematic stabilizing 
actions by fi scal policymakers seem to be more effective at stabilizing pri-
vate consumption, possibly because they are better targeted. Alternatively, 
this could indicate that our indicator of cyclical fi scal policy also captures 
automatic stabilizers on the expenditure side, which are by design targeted at 
smoothing individual consumer income. Finally, the interaction between the 
CBI index and our measure of the discretionary dimension of fi scal policy 
remains strong and statistically signifi cant.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
This paper revisits the empirical link between fi scal policy and mac-
roeconomic volatility (output and private consumption). Our analysis is 
based on a sample of 49 developing and advanced economies spanning the 
last 40 years. Results generally provide strong support for the view that fi s-
cal stabilization operates mainly through automatic stabilizers. By contrast, 
fi scal policies systematically linked to cyclical conditions—be they pro- or 
counter-cyclical—do not appear to have a meaningful impact on output vol-
atility. Finally, fi scal variability not systematically related to the business 
cycle generally seems to increase output and consumption volatility, pos-
sibly due in part to confl icts with monetary authorities. However, these latter 
two results may suffer from a simultaneity bias because certain sources of 
budgetary volatility (e.g. exchange rate, or infl ation) are correlated with out-
put volatility. Outside fi scal policy, fi nancial development seems to exert a 
moderating infl uence on income and, even more so, on consumption growth, 
but robustness analysis indicates that it may proxy the role of other country-
specifi c features not included in our analysis. As regards monetary policy, 
central bank independence is associated with lower volatility, provided that 
the interaction between monetary and fi scal policies is taken into account.
20. Running the same regressions with the unrestricted indicator of cyclical policy indeed re-
duces  and increases errors.
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The analysis contributes to the relevant literature in two ways. First, 
we show that the effectiveness of automatic stabilizers extends well beyond 
the narrow sample of 20 OECD countries explored by Fatás and Mihov 
(2001) and apply with equal strength to a broader set of highly heterogene-
ous countries, including developing economies. Second, our robustness tests 
strike a note of caution on the causal nature of the relationship between dis-
cretionary policy activism and output volatility (Fatás and Mihov, 2003). 
Broader policy implications emerge. First, fi scal policy is unambigu-
ously effective at durably stabilizing the economy when it operates in the 
same way as automatic stabilizers (in a timely, reasonably predictable and 
symmetric way). Second, governments could also contribute to macroeco-
nomic stability by subjecting the pursuit of other objectives (redistribution 
or effi ciency) to a “stability test.” Our results indeed suggest that a conscious 
effort to reduce confl icts among public fi nance objectives and between mon-
etary and fi scal policies could reduce output volatility. One practical way to do 
so is to subject budget preparation to quantitative objectives or even binding 
constraints defi ned in terms of a structural balance or expenditure ceilings.
That said, an exclusive reliance on automatic stabilizers as the chan-
nel of fi scal stabilization has limits and potential drawbacks. In terms of the 
limits, recent experience suggests that government revenues endogenously 
respond to asset price cycles not necessarily synchronized with the busi-
ness cycle. The induced swings in commonly estimated structural budget 
balances may be diffi cult to sustain politically, leading to pro-cyclical fi s-
cal expansions when structural surpluses appear substantial (Alesina, 2000). 
Also, automatic stabilizers may be insuffi cient in case of acute crises, or 
when other policy instruments or consumption smoothing opportunities are 
constrained. 
In terms of the drawbacks, the fact that large stabilizers come with 
large government sectors may adversely affect potential growth and the 
economy’s resilience to shocks; and as our analysis suggests, it could also 
increase the likelihood of destabilizing fi scal shocks. In light of these limits 
and drawbacks, a number of proposals to enhance fi scal stabilizers with-
out increasing the size of government have been made. For instance, given 
the diffi culty to design effective fi scal stimulus plans and the incomplete 
credibility of subsequent consolidations, automatic adjustments in selected 
tax rates or expenditure programs could be envisaged (see Baunsgaard and 
Symansky, 2009, for a survey and an assessment).
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Looking forward, further research will need to address a number of 
pending issues. First, we see a need to explore more systematically the ap-
parently strong impact of monetary-fi scal confl icts on macroeconomic vola-
tility, as this could have important implications for the design of macro-fi scal 
frameworks. In particular, alternative measures of the quality of monetary 
policy should be envisaged. Second, we ignored the impact of expenditure 
and revenue composition on the size of fi scal stabilizers, possibly introduc-
ing measurement errors. Third, and related, more work is needed to improve 
measures of automatic stabilizers—particularly to have a better grasp of the 
role of expenditure composition—and of fi scal discretion.
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VI. APPENDIX
Data Sources
Data on government size (general government expenditure as a per-
centage of GDP), GDP per capita, openness to trade, public debt (percentage 
of GDP), private consumption, dependency ratio and urbanization rates are 
obtained from the IMF World Economic Outlook Database. Financial de-
velopment, which is captured by the total stock of credit by deposit money 
banks to private sector as percentage of GDP, and indices of oil prices are 
obtained from the IMF International Financial Statistics. Data on political 
and electoral systems is from the Database of Political Institutions (Beck and 
others, 2001). The political constraint index is from the POLCON database 
(Henisz, 2006). The index of government stability is from the International 
Country Risk Guide database. The index of Central Bank Independence is 
from Crowe and Meade (2008).
Automatic stabilizers, fi scal multipliers and 
It is useful to illustrate the link between our estimates of the impact of 
automatic stabilizers and conventional measures of fi scal policy effective-
ness. For simplicity, the starting point is a log-linear, backward-looking IS 
equation: 
  (A.1)
with       and    ,
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where the output gap21 y depends on the government budget defi cit d, the 
real interest rate, the real exchange rate, external demand, and a random 
disturbance (all these with obvious notations). The decomposition be-
tween the cyclical and the cyclically-adjusted defi cit ( ) can be written 
as: , where  denotes the sensitivity of the budget 
defi cit to the output gap. The cyclically-adjusted defi cit itself refl ects the 
cyclical policy and a residual: , with . Hence, 
. Substituting for the budget defi cit, we can write the 
long-run relationship ( ) as follows:
Clearly, greater automatic stabilizers, a more countercyclical discre-
tionary fi scal policy and a greater fi scal multiplier all contribute to offset IS 
shocks:
.
To illustrate how these fi scal policy parameters relate to the estimated 
impact of automatic stabilizers on output volatility in the empirical model, 
let us write the variance of the output gap as:22
,
with 
This implies:
, and 
21. A similar relationship can be assumed to hold for the log of output.
22. The same expression applies to the fi rst difference of the output gap.
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.
Stronger automatic stabilizers thus reduce the standard deviation of 
the output gap, but at a decreasing rate because stabilizers themselves run 
against the potency of exogenous fi scal impulses. This second-round effect 
likely explains why using the logarithm of government size (instead of its 
level) generally yields better statistical results. The link between  and the 
fi scal policy parameters can be written as:
Using equation (A.3), we can determine a range of values for 
consistent with plausible calibration of the various parameters. As 
is not observable, we simply assume —in line with recent empirical esti-
mates23— that fi scal policy can stabilize about one third of shocks to . We 
thus set  equal to 1.5 times our sample’s measure of output variabil-
ity. Assuming24 that , that  spans over [0.1; 1.5] and that govern-
ment size can be anywhere between 0.2 and 0.6, the implied values for  
lies between -2.64 and -0.48. We can also use equation (A.3) to calculate, for 
given government size, the range of values of fi scal policy multipliers im-
plicit in our estimates of  Taking the sample average of government size 
of 0.38 and assuming that discretionary fi scal policy is acyclical (
), the 95 percent confi dence interval of  (i.e. [-2.81;-1.22])25 maps into 
“fi scal multipliers”  between 0.4 and 1.5. 
Replicating this exercise for the 95 percent confi dence interval of  using the 
standard deviation of the output gap as the measure of volatility (i.e. [-2.29;-
0.92]), we obtain somewhat lower multipliers (between 0.4 and 1.0). 
23. For recent evidence, see Dolls, Fuest and Peichl (2009).
24. The value for the persistence parameter was set on the basis of the average value obtained
in straightforward OLS estimations of equation (A.1) for a variety of advanced countries in our 
sample.
25. This refers to the regression (3) in Table 2 of the main text.
